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Taking the Courts:
A Brief History of Takings Jurisprudence and
the Relationship Between State, Federal, and
the United States Supreme Courts
by RACHEL A. RUBIN*
Introduction
Regulatory takings law today is criticized as a confused muddle,'
intractable,' as an ambiguous area in which the United States
Supreme Court complicates its own jurisprudence with each new
decision, and as an area in which the Court fails to "revisit its
regulatory takings precedent in order to clarify the current
standard."3 Though this is true to some extent, it is because the often
fact-specific nature of takings cases leads to results that are
"pragmatic at the expense of internal consistency."4
J.D. 2008 (expected), University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2003,
Rhetoric, English with High Honors, University of California, Berkeley. In the fall, the
author will be an associate at Reed Smith LLP in Los Angeles, CA. She would like to
thank her parents, Patricia and Harold Rubin, for their inspiration and lifelong love of
writing, Andrew Ziaja and the sensational staff of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly Volume 35, and Professor Brian Gray for nurturing her interest in
environmental and property law.
1. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings "Muddle," 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006). See also Mark Fenster,
Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity,
92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 612 (2004); D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential
Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive
Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 343 (2005).
2. William A. Fletcher, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel, Takings Law Now
Belongs to the States, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 767, 776 (2006).
3. Keri Ann Kilcommons, Note, A Survey of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence:
The Impact of Del Monte Dunes on Nollan, Dolan, Agins, and Lucas, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 532, 533 (2001).
4. David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the
Practice and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 721
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The basic takings framework is as follows. In general, when a
government regulation results in the permanent physical occupation
of property5 or when it deprives an owner of all economically viable
use of his property,6 it is a taking, unless it is not.7 In the case of
exactions, which are a special class of regulatory takings wherein the
government conditions an owner's ability to use his land is a
particular way based on the surrender of a property right, regulations
are subject to the "essential nexus" test in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,8 and the "rough proportionality" test of Dolan
v. City of Tigard.9 All other cases are decided under the multi-factor
calculus in Penn Central Transportation Corp. v. New York City. °
Until recently, because of the complexity and uncertainty of result
under Penn Central, courts relied on a "short-form alternative"" test
set out in Agins v. City of Tiburon." The Agins two-prong test found
a compensable taking when the regulation "[did] not substantially
advance legitimate state interests.., or den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land."13  The Court overruled the "substantially
advances" prong of the Agins test in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
finding that the test was "an inquiry in the nature of a due process,
not a takings, test," and "has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence. 1 4 Lingle is an important step toward more clarity in
judicial takings analysis. It is also a rare admission of mistake and an
attempt to correct course on the part of the Court.15 However, the
(1999). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (noting that
property regulation decisions are "question[s] of degree-and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions.").
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(finding that a state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cables on
apartment buildings constituted a taking).
6. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1019 (1992).
7. See Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 827. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (stating
that limitations on the use of property "inheres in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership," then it is non-compensable).
8. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
9. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
10. Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
11. Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 828.
12. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
13. Id. at 260.
14. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
15. Id. at 531.
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complexity of takings jurisprudence has a long judicial and social
history.
This paper traces the role of the federal courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court with regard to review of state judicial changes in
takings or property law. It examines the position of the federal courts
in their review of both physical and regulatory takings cases. Part I
addresses the political and social history behind the development of
takings jurisprudence, and offers some contextual reasons for the
murky law. Part II explains the four primary ways in which a plaintiff
can mount a takings challenge, and the related role of the courts with
regard to each theory. Part III looks toward future takings challenges
and the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's current trend
toward rule-formalist analysis. Rather than conclude that the takings
doctrine is "a hopeless mess," the paper finds that there is a light at
the end of the dark tunnel. 6 The focus is now squarely on whether
the government action took property" and on the impact of the
government action on the property owner, which reaffirms the fact-
specific nature of takings case analysis.
I. Short Political and Social History of Takings Jurisprudence
The principles of federalism underscore our constitutional law of
property. Since Erie v. Tompkins," the general presumption is that
"state law is the primary source and determinant scope of the limits of
property."1 9 Because property law is the product of judge-made
common law, an owner's property rights "extend only as far as state
property law says they do," and states have considerable discretion to
determine and adjust their property laws.0 With that in mind, it
would seem that federalism concerns would play a greater role in
takings jurisprudence than they seem to have done.
One explanation for the complexity of takings jurisprudence and
the consistently evolving role of the federal court is political.
16. Barros, supra note 1, at 356.
17. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-43.
18. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (finding that a federal court sitting in
diversity should apply state law and not federal common law).
19. Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 833-34.
20. Id. at 834. See also Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due
Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 402-04 (2001)
(describing property as the product of the dynamic relationship between common law and
legislation).
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Legislative and social valuations of constitutional rights have changed
and developed over the years, and judicial treatment of these rights
has varied accordingly." James W. Ely noted that the New Deal era
saw a great shift in the constitutional status of property rights.' Until
the rise of the Progressive movement in the 1930s, the protection of
property rights were a central theme in American constitutional
jurisprudence." "Legal theorists associated with the Progressives
argued that constitutional doctrine overstated the importance of
property and contractual rights."24  Ely argues that the Great
Depression and the New Deal "constituted a watershed in
constitutional history" because of the New Deal emphasis on broader
federal government and away from individual property owners'
rights. He points to the famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products,26 in which the Court established the rational basis
standard of review and "signaled that it would give a higher degree of
due process scrutiny to a preferred class of individual rights, such as
free speech and religious freedom, than to property rights."27 Ely
argues that this hierarchy of rights affected judicial treatment of
property rights and takings claims for the next fifty years.'
This hierarchy may also have roots in the language of the Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
21. C.f Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (racial segregation in
public schools); Empl. Div. Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (free exercise of religion).
22. James W. Ely, Jr., "Poor Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004-05 CATO SUPR. CT. REV. 39, 45 (2004-05)
[hereinafter Poor Relation]. Though property rights continue to be a major theme in
American constitutional jurisprudence, other issues have also risen to prominence in more
recent years.
23. Id. See also JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A




26. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (denying a Fifth
Amendment challenge to the Filled Milk Act of 1923, J. Harlan Fisk Stone distinguished
the rational relation test as the appropriate standard of judicial review of economic
regulations affecting commercial activity and laws that allegedly violate personal
constitutional rights).
27. Poor Relation, supra note 22, at 46.
28. GUARDIAN, supra note 23, at 132-34.
29. U.S.CONST. amend. V.
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Amendment?0 The Fifth Amendment regulates the way in which the
government can apply its power to the individual. It states
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.3
Ostensibly, the order of the phrases (according to Ely) set out a
general hierarchy of restraints on the exercise of state power, from
capital punishment on one end to eminent domain on the other.32
Perhaps the placement of property rights at the bottom of the
amendment (not to mention the associations and implications of
property rights in the political sphere) guided federal court treatment
of property and takings claims as well.
For many years, the United States Supreme Court was relatively
silent on the Takings Clause. The dramatic increase in the rate of
residential development and population growth has led to an increase
in the number of takings cases that reach the federal courts and the
United States Supreme Court. In recent years, the Supreme Court
has moved toward a more formal, rule-based takings analysis. Its
latest decisions have attempted to clarify and streamline previous
takings jurisprudence. Part of this process involves a hard look at the
role of the federal courts-and specifically the Supreme Court-with
regard to state court and legislative determinations of takings.
H. Takings Challenges Today
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed four
theories under which a plaintiff can challenge a government
regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property. A
plaintiff can allege "a 'physical' taking, a Lucas-type 'total regulatory
taking,' a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the
standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan."33 The standard of review
30. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
31. Id.
32. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 723.
33. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
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and the related role of the Supreme Court in evaluating the state
court holding and definition of taking and property rights differs
under each theory. This section examines these four theories and the
cases behind them. It then goes on to examine three of the Supreme
Court's most recent takings decisions34 and the implications that these
decisions have for the future of takings jurisprudence.
A. The Role of the Federal Judiciary Before Kelo, Lingle, and San
Remo
The most recent Supreme Court takings cases have not only been
the most sensational, but have clarified and limited takings
jurisprudence. Taken together, these three cases represent a
substantial change in the relationship between state courts and the
United States Supreme Court. Though they maintain the default
multi-factor balancing test described in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,35 they indicate a significant shift toward




There are two categories of regulatory government action that
are generally considered per se takings for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. The first is a taking in the classic sense: a permanent
physical occupation. When the government requires a landowner to
suffer a permanent physical occupation (or authorizes a permanent
physical invasion) of her property, the government must pay the
landowner just compensation.37  In Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CA TV Corp., the appellant purchased apartment
buildings on which the previous owner had allowed a cable company
to install cables and to provide cable services to the building
occupants.38 The appellant challenged the New York State law that
required landlords to allow cable companies to install cable facilities
34. Id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
35. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(determining that a building regulation aimed at historical preservation was not a
regulatory taking, identifying several factors that contribute to this analysis, and finding
that regulatory takings cases should be evaluated on a case by case basis).
36. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 776.
37. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
38. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
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on the landlord's property on the grounds that it constituted a
compensable taking. 9  The Court agreed that "a minor but
permanent physical occupation" of private property constituted a
compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
Under the categorical Loretto rule, the court must answer two
questions to determine whether the case falls under the multi-factor
Penn Central test or the per se test. First, did the property owner
consent to the initial physical occupation, or was the occupation
forced upon the owner by the government?41 Second, is this a
permanent physical occupation, for example one in which the
property owner could escape the occupation by changing the use of
the land to a purpose not covered by the challenged regulation?42
The Loretto holding is "very narrow," as the Court seemed
reluctant to take on a role beyond one of the arbiter of the degree of
the degree of a physical occupation.43 The Court limited its decision
to consider only whether there was a permanent physical occupation,
not the import of the extent of such occupation or the necessary
compensation for it.'  The character of a permanent physical
occupation, even when that occupation is the size of a few television
cables on the side of a building, is "qualitatively more intrusive than
perhaps any other category of property regulation. 4 5 However, the
Court remained very deferential to a state's power to regulate an
46owner's use of his property.
2. Total Regulatory Takings Under Lucas
The second category of per se takings covers those government
regulations that deprive a property owner of "all economically
beneficial use" of his property.47 This is also a relatively narrow
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 429; see also http://web.mac.com/graybe/iWeb/Site%203/Takings
%20Seminar. html (follow "Updates" hyperlink; then follow "Summary of the Law.doc"
hyperlink) [hereinafter Summary].
42. Id. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see F.C.C. v. Florida Power Group, 480
U.S. 245 (1987) (finding power company's prior consent to the placement of cable
television lines and boxes on their utility poles removed the case from the per se takings
rules of Loretto).
43. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
44. Id. at 437-38.
45. Id. at 441.
46. Id.
47. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original).
Summer 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
category of takings because most state or local government
regulations will not rise to the level of a total regulatory taking. 41 Of
those that do, there is a second test: If the regulated use constitutes a
noxious use or some form of nuisance already regulated at common
law, then the state need not provide compensation to the landowner. 9
The cases subjected to takings scrutiny are often those in which the
court finds that the right asserted by the plaintiff was not his in the
first place. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilr is an example of
such a case.
In Lucas, a beachfront property owner challenged a state
regulation as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 1 Lucas argued
that the regulation rendered his property valueless because it
effectively barred him from erecting any "permanent habitable
structures" on the property, and thus required just compensation. 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that the
state was acting within its power to prevent noxious uses of property. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, and Thomas:
when government restrictions on the use of a tract of land
deprive the owner of all "economically beneficial or productive
options for its use," the government is constitutionally obligated
to compensate the owner, unless the regulation does "no more
than duplicate the result that could have been achieved...
under the State's law of private nuisance" or by the State itself
using the doctrine of public nuisance. 4
In other words, any state law that effectively denies a private property
owner all economically beneficial use of his property is a taking
per se."
Professor Richard Lazarus argues that Lucas is likely "the high-
water mark for constitutional protection of private property" because
the facts of the case were terrible from the government's perspective
48. Id. at 1026.
49. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1993).
50. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
51. Id. at 1006.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1009-10.
54. William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393
(1993) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018, 1029, 1009-10).
55. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
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and the Court "was dominated by a conservative supermajority that
was predisposed against the government's position."56 Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia was unable to construct a majority decision that South
Carolina's regulation constituted a compensable taking. 7 The Court
instead remanded the case back to the state court for a determination
of whether common-law "background principles" would have
prevented any development on the land.58 The Lucas court built in an
exception to the per se rule for cases in which the property owner
never held the claimed right under the "background principles" of
state property or nuisance law. 9 David Sarratt argues that states can
use this exception to avoid paying compensation for actions that are
effectively takings.' He argues that the exception would function
properly as such in a perfect world where statutes were enacted to
replace or define common law background principles and the courts
"decide questions retrospectively, saying what the law is and has
been."6
Professor Lazarus questions the ultimate impact of Lucas with
regard to the relationship between the federal and state courts as
follows:
Lucas' bite may ultimately turn on the lower courts' willingness
to accept the majority's invitation to scrutinize state court
property and tort rulings to determine whether they are
supported by "an objectively reasonable application of relevant
precedents." Unfortunately, "takings" plaintiffs may not be able
to take advantage of that limitation. State court judges are not
likely to conclude that their own application of precedent is not
"objectively reasonable." And, while federal judges might be
more willing to second-guess their state judicial counterparts,
they are not likely to have much opportunity to do so. The
Supreme Court's ripeness rules effectively require that "as
applied" takings challenges be initiated in state administrative
and judicial fora. The Supreme Court's new emphasis on the
background principles of state property and tort law may also
56. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411,
1425 (1993).
57. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32; see also Lazarus, supra note 56, at 1425-26.
58. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
59. W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV.
1487, 1489 (2004) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029).
60. Id. at 1490.
61. Id. at 1491.
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prompt federal court abstention to provide state courts with the
first opportunity to resolve those issues of state law.62
In other words, the Supreme Court provides a paradoxical limitation
on the state courts. The Court acknowledges that there is "no doubt
some leeway in a court's interpretation of what existing state law
permits," but not nearly as much leeway as in a legislative
determination of the scope of a regulation.63 In order for a state court
to properly address a takings challenge, at least according to the
Supreme Court, that state court must make and objectively review its
own decision at the same time. While this is reasonable and desirable
from a federal court (and constitutional) perspective, it likely will be
inconsistent in its application. Though it may reduce the number of
takings challenges that reach the Supreme Court, it does not
necessarily improve the quality of review of those challenges. It may
also keep more takings challenges within states, which limits the
federal and Supreme Courts' opportunities to review and define
uniform means to adjudicate takings challenges.
3. Nollan, Dolan, and Land-Use Exactions
Land-use exactions are a special form of government regulation.
They are quid pro quo cases in which, for example, the government
demands a landowner dedicate a public easement over her property
as a condition for obtaining a development permit.6' Other examples
of exactions include "mandatory dedications of land, fees required in
lieu of dedication, and impact fees given by property owners in
exchange for permits, zoning changes, and other regulatory
clearances." 6  While takings law mandates that the "majority of
regulatory acts enjoy deferential treatment in an ad hoc balancing
test," courts review exactions under a "rule-formalist heightened
scrutiny."66
The Supreme Court decided in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission67 and in Dolan v. City of Tigarde that there must be an
"essential nexus" between the government conditions placed on the
62. Lazarus, supra note 56, at 1430-31 (citations omitted).
63. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992).
64. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
65. Fenster, supra note 1, at 613.
66. Id. at 611.
67. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
68. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383.
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use of land and the problems created by that use or development.69 In
other words, a condition placed on development must redress the
problems caused by the development, and the condition must be
"roughly proportionate" to those problems.70  Under Nollan, a
regulation that would otherwise be a taking may be imposed without
compensation if these criteria are satisfied.71 If a local government
fails to meet either requirement, the regulatory act is a taking and the
property owner is entitled to just compensation.
The essential nexus and rough proportionality tests established in
Nollan and Dolan do not apply beyond the limited class of land-use
exactions. The rationale for this limitation is based on the
"similarity of conditional exactions to prior precedent establishing
government's physical occupation of property as warranting higher
scrutiny under the Takings Clause."73 In Nollan, the state government
conditioned the plaintiff's ability to build a larger home on his
beachfront property on the dedication of a public easement that
allowed access between the owner's seawall and the mean high-tide
line.74 In Dolan, the state government conditioned a permit to expand
a store and parking lot on the dedication of a portion of the property
for a bicycle and pedestrian pathway.75 Permanent physical invasions
are classic takings, and are the most serious form of invasion of
private property rights.
4. Penn Central Takings
Outside of the relatively narrow Loretto and Lucas takings and
special land-use exactions, the default standard for regulatory takings
challenges is the multi-factor Penn Central balancing test.76 The Penn
Central decision identified "several factors that have particular
significance" in the outcome of a takings challenge. 77 These factors
include "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
69. Id.; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Summary at 1.
70. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
71. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
72. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, 526 U.S. 687, 704
(1999).
73. Kilcommons, supra note 3, at 559.
74. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
75. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380.
76. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
77. Id.
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distinct investment-backed expectations,... [the] character of the
governmental action."" When a government regulation amounts to a
physical invasion rather than affects property rights through a "public
program [that adjusts] benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good," it is more likely to be a taking. 9 The
balance of these factors rests in judicial discretion.
This balancing test is perhaps better described as a "framework
for analysis"8 ° or a "calculus",8' rather than a free-standing test that
yields predictable and consistent results. Though the Court has
enunciated a more rule-based takings doctrine through Lucas,
Loretto, Nollan, and Dolan, the narrow interpretations of those cases
and the narrow circumstances in which they apply ultimately returned
Penn Central to the forefront of regulatory takings analysis.' The
Penn Central analysis provides for a more nuanced evaluation of the
facts of a case, which is likely why "the ideological middle of the
Court, represented by Justice Anthony Kennedy and former Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, consistently resisted the effort by the more
conservative wing of the Court, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, to
develop a more rule-based approach to takings." 3  Some
commentators argue that because the Court has not provided strict
guidelines as to how to apply the Penn Central factors or which
factors to weigh above others, that the multi-factor calculus
"mask[s] ... considerable uncertainty about the parameters of takings
law."" On the other hand, perhaps this is the Court's way of
acknowledging that takings cases are necessarily fact specific and that
state interests, public interests, and the meaning of "public benefit"85
and public harm86 do and should change over time. In order to meet




80. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 171, 208 (2005).
81. Brian Gray, The Modern Takings Clause: Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, available at http://web.mac.com/graybe/iWeb/Site%203/Assignments.html. (follow
the "Takings 08 Penn Central.pdf" hyperlink).
82. Echeverria, supra note 80, at 173.
83. Id. at 174.
84. Id.
85. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) (quoting
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-669 (1887)).
86. Id. at 130-31. See also Echeverria, supra note 80, at 175-77.
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The Penn Central, Lucas, and Loretto inquiries seek to "identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic
taking in which government directly appropriates private property or
ousts the owner from his domain." Because each test focuses on the
degree of the burden imposed on private property rights, the Court
remains an arbiter of scale.
B. Kelo and the Broad Delegation of Land Use Decisions to State and
Local Governments
Kelo v. City of New London"' is probably the most famous recent
takings case. After the decision, there was a strong public backlash
against the government's use of eminent domain.89 A number of
states passed legislation to restrict the power of state and local
governments to condemn private property for redevelopment
projects.' The issue remains active in state legislatures.
In Kelo, the City of New London, Connecticut had experienced
years of economic downturn and was designated an "economically
distressed city" by the State of Connecticut.91 The city approved a
redevelopment project for its waterfront in an effort to encourage
community economic revitalization. The city proposed to build a
large complex including shopping areas, a hotel, office space, new
residential construction, and a public park.' Significant portions of
the proposed redevelopment area were to be owned by private
landowners. The city believed that this redevelopment project would
create significant economic benefit both for the neighborhood and for
87. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528,539 (2005).
88. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
89. See William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2006, at Al. See also Judy Coleman, The Powers of the Few, the Anger of the Many,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2; Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June
27, 2005, at A14.
90. For a discussion of 2006 ballot measures regarding eminent domain, see JOHN D.
ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE, ALL OVER
THE MAP: THE DIVERSITY OF 2006 STATE BALLOT MEASURES ADDRESSING EMINENT
DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/gelpi/current research/eminentdomain/eminentpub.cfm; see also Richard M. Frank
et al., CAL. CTR. FOR ENVT'L LAW & POLICY, PROPOSITION 90: AN ANALYSIS, (Oct.
2006), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/. Only two of the eleven 2006 state
ballot measures on eminent domain failed. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. at U.S.C.,
Ballotwatch: Election Results 2006, (Nov. 2006), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
BW%202006-5%20(Election%20results).pdf
91. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
92. Id. at 473.
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the city at large.93 In order to complete the project, the city purchased
property from willing sellers, and proposed to use its power of
eminent domain to acquire the remaining property.94
A small group of homeowners refused to sell their properties
voluntarily to the city. These properties were not "blighted or
otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only
because they happen to be located in the development area." 95 After
the city commenced formal condemnation procedures against them,
the homeowners filed a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the New
London Superior Court.' The United States Supreme Court
ultimately granted certiorari to determine whether the city's decision
to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfied
the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause.9 The Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, ruled in favor of the city, finding that
the city's action was consistent with the Fifth Amendment.99 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, rested the decision largely on two
earlier cases, Berman v. Parker99 and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiffl °° which both emphasized a broad understanding of the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. The majority
opinion emphasized that the government does not have the power to
condemn one private landowner's property just to confer an
economic benefit on another private party.'°1 However, in this case
the government intended to provide general economic benefits on the
community as a whole, which was a legitimate public use."0
Justices O'Connor and Thomas filed vigorous dissenting
opinions. Justice O'Connor, who wrote the unanimous opinion in
Midkiff, argued that Midkiff and Berman were easily distinguishable
from Kelo in that they both dealt with severe problems posed by
existing land use.'3 Furthermore, she argued, the majority's holding
that the construction of economic development projects may
93. Id. at 474.
94. Id. at 472.
95. Id. at 475.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 477.
98. Id. at 477-78.
99. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
100. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
101. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485-87.
102. Id. at 489-90.
103. Id. at 498-99.
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constitute a public use means that "all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner,
so long as it might be upgraded-i.e., given to an owner who will use
it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public-in
the process. ""m Even though Justice Stevens stated clearly that the
property at issue in Kelo was not blighted, he still found that it fell
within the rules established by Berman and Midkiff."
Justice Thomas urged a narrower interpretation of the Takings
Clause's public use requirement. He argued for a return to the
original understanding of the Public Use Clause: "[T]hat the
government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the
public a legal right to use the property."10 6 Unlike the majority, he did
not equate public use with public purpose.n7 He refused to afford
deference to "legislative conclusions that a use serves a 'public
use, ' '08 and, also contrary to the majority, found that Berman and
Midkiff were wrong."
Unlike Lingle and San Remo where the Court was more
concerned with its role vis-A-vis the state courts, the Court in Kelo
defined the role of the Court vis-A-vis state legislatures. On one hand,
this focus was necessitated by the facts of the case, but is also perhaps
part of a larger move toward defining the role of the federal court in
Fifth Amendment takings cases. To wit, in the 2004 term in which the
Supreme Court decided Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo, the Court
continued a trend that favored economic regulation and state and
local government use of eminent domain over private property
interests. In order to define the proper venue in which to address
takings issues, the Court must address both the state government and
the state courts. In fact, Kelo may be more firmly rooted in political
theory or policy than Justice Stevens was willing to admit."0 "The
majority opinion masks a balancing of social and administrative costs
behind precedent and leaves state courts and/or legislatures with the
burden of crafting a test or legislation, respectively, that balances the
104. Id. at 494.
105. Id. at 482-84.
106. Id. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. See Eric Rutkow, Case Comment, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARV.
ENVT'L. L. REV. 261,270 (2006).
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rights of property owners with the needs of developers...''. The Court
did not replace a legislative test with a judicial one, however."'
C. Lingle and the Shift Toward Doctrinal Coherence
Lingle stands out in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence not
only because it was a unanimous decision, but because of its "its
unusual commitment to producing doctrinally coherent takings
standards."".3  The Court recognized the multiplicity of tests in its
takings jurisprudence 4 and sought to "correct course.."
The core question in Lingle was whether the "substantially
advance" test was a takings test or a substantive due process test."'
Lingle was the first chance the Supreme Court had to address the
"substantially advance" test of Agins on the merits. The conflicting
results in the lower courts took this test to "its logical conclusion, and
in so doing, revealed its imprecision."''. Because the Court made
such a clear statement regarding the appropriate takings test, it is
worthwhile to quickly trace the procedural history of Lingle so as to
better understand the Court's doctrinal decision.
In Lingle, Chevron challenged a Hawaii law that limited the rent
charged by oil companies to the operators of service stations."'
Chevron contended that the rent-control law constituted a taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."9 Hawaii argued to the
district court that the statute was intended to protect consumers from
high gasoline prices that would result from "concentration of the
retail gasoline market."'20 Chevron based its takings argument on the
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Sarah B. Nelson, Case Comment, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 286 (2006). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and
Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1099 (1997); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that "our
regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified"). But see G. Richard
Hill, Partial Takings after Dolan, in TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT-REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 189, 189 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (arguing that
before Lingle "in fact it [was] quite simple for the government to steer clear of
[regulatory] takings problems").
114. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
115. Id. at 548.
116. Id. at 532.
117. Id. at 548.
118. Id. at 533.
119. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
120. Id. at 533.
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point that Hawaii's zoning laws failed to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, and would not work as intended.' The
district court agreed with Chevron and granted summary judgment on
the basis that the statute did not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest, and thus constituted a compensable taking."' The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
"had applied the correct legal standard," but vacated the grant of
summary judgment on the grounds that a "genuine issue of material
fact remained as to whether the Act would benefit consumers.' 2  On
remand, the trial was limited to the testimony of competing expert
witnesses."' The district court again entered judgment for Chevron,
and found again that the statute would not work as intended.11 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed again.'26 Hence,
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Hawaii
statute had been held to be an unconstitutional taking because
the trial court concluded, based on its finding that one
economics expert was more credible than the other, that the
Hawaii legislature had done something stupid. The Supreme
Court, understandably unimpressed with the proceedings
below, concluded that the district court, based on a battle of
expert economists, had improperly substituted its judgment for
that of the Hawaii legislature.
After "seeing the substantially advance test in action,"' the Supreme
Court concluded the test was a substantive due process that "ha[d] no
proper place in... takings jurisprudence.'
129
Professor David Shultz argues that the significance of Lingle is
that it reaffirms claims in two early takings cases, Berman v. Parker"'
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,"' "which gave government




125. Id. at 535-36.
126. Id. at 536.
127. Barros, supra note 1, at 347.
128. Id.
129. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541.
130. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (finding constitutional the condemnation of
private property for transfer to a private real estate developer where the overall purpose
of the project served a the public purpose of community redevelopment).
131. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (allowing condemnations of
private property for public use when the exercise of eminent domain by state governments
is rationally related to a public purpose).
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significant discretion to interpret 'public use' broadly, including for
economic development cases.""3 2  Further, he argues that this
"reaffirmed broad judicial deference to legislative decisions" on
economic regulation. Beyond this, the ultimate impact of Lingle is
that it refocused the court's analysis away from whether the act
advanced a legitimate state interest, which is the inquiry under a
substantive due process analysis, and back on the effect of the
government's action on the private property at issue) 34
The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle effectively sent the
message that the federal courts would take an even more hands-off
approach to regulatory takings. The decision broadened the
regulatory power of state and local authorities in land use cases."
"After Lingle, the only regulatory takings test is whether the
regulation effectively takes away all economically viable use of the
property., 136 The case has great potential to further clarify regulatory
takings law in the future, and will certainly have a significant on the
ways and means that takings challenges reach and succeed in federal
court.
D. San Remo and Issue Preclusion: Keeping Takings Claims in the
State Courts
A discussion of the role of the Supreme Court and federal courts
vis-A-vis state courts necessarily begs the question of the role of the
full faith and credit statute and of issue and claim preclusion. San
Remo grew out of a complicated litigation history, but ultimately
presented the procedural question of "whether the federal courts
could create an exception to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."1
37
The San Remo Hotel is a "three-story, 62-unit hotel in the
Fisherman's Wharf neighborhood of San Francisco.' 38  After the
earthquake of 1906 that destroyed most of the city, the hotel, then
132. David Schultz, The Property Rights Revolution That Failed: Eminent Domain in
the 2004 Supreme Court Term, 21 TOURO L. REV. 929, 977 (2006).
133. Id.
134. See Barros, supra note 1, at 348.
135. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 777-78.
136. Id.
137. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 326
(2005).
138. Id. at 327.
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operating under a different name, served as a home for "dislocated
individuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers.' ' 139 By the 1970s, it was
a bed and breakfast inn." In response to a severe shortage of
affordable housing for the elderly, disabled, and low-income, the city
issued a moratorium on the conversion of residential units into tourist
units.14' The city enacted a series of ordinances that regulated permits
to convert residential units into tourist units, and the city and the
hotel engaged in protracted disputes over these permit regulations.'1
2
In 1990, the hotel applied to the city to convert all of the rooms to
tourist use rooms. San Francisco approved the conversion, but
required a $567,000 "in lieu" fee.'" The hotel appealed, arguing that
the regulation was "unconstitutional and otherwise improperly
applied" to them.
45
The hotel first tried the issue in state court, but the parties
agreed to stay the action while San Remo pursued a takings claim in
federal court. San Remo filed for the first time in federal court in
1993, alleging four counts of due process, both substantive and
procedural, and takings, both facial and as-applied, under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.146 There were numerous subsequent
administrative, state, and federal court appeals on the regulatory
takings claim. A federal district court ultimately granted the city
summary judgment on the theory that the plaintiffs' claim was
unripe.' 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that the facial takings claims were ripe, but
agreed with the hotel owners to abstain under Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Pullman Co.'4 on the basis that "a return to state court
could conceivably moot the remaining federal questions.'419  The
Ninth Circuit also found that the hotel owners' as-applied claims were
unripe for review because the owners had failed to pursue a
139. Id.
140. Id. at 328.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 328-29.
143. Id. at 329.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 330.
147. Id.
148. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
149. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 330-31.
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compensation action in state court'5 ° as contemplated by Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City.'
5'
The hotel owners pursued this action when they reactivated the
dormant California case, but reserved the federal takings claims for
later decision by the federal court.'52 The state court ruled against
them on the state law takings claim, and decided both federal and
state issues, despite the hotel owners' reservation of the federal
claims.'53 The principal constitutional issue in the California Supreme
Court was whether heightened scrutiny applied; the court found the
proper standard of review was the rational relationship test.5
Once the state decision was final, the hotel owners came back to
federal court to re-litigate the issues they believed they had
reserved.'55 The district court found the hotel's facial challenge was
barred by both the statute of limitations and by issue preclusion.'56
The preclusion argument was based on 28 U.S.C. 1738, which requires
a federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state court
judgment as the courts of that state would give that judgment. The
California court had interpreted the "relevant substantive state
takings law coextensively with federal law," so San Remo's federal
claims had already been resolved in state court.57 The United States
Supreme Court held, over the hotel's arguments under England v.
Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners,58 that federal courts should
review reserved federal claims de novo, that preclusive effect should
be given to the state court determination in accordance with
California's laws of issue preclusion." 9 Justice Stevens pointed out
that England stands for the proposition that "when a federal court
abstains from deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable state
courts to address an antecedent state-law issue, the plaintiff may
reserve his right to return to federal court for the disposition of his
150. Id. at 331.
151. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).
152. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 331.
153. Id. at 332-33.
154. Id. at 333.
155. Id. at 334.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 335.
158. England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
159. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 339-340.
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claims" only when the state and federal claims are distinct from one
another.'6  Justice Stevens found the issues in San Remo were so
interconnected that England did not apply.6
The Court then rejected the hotel owners' argument that issue
preclusion should not apply when a case is "forced into state court by
the ripeness rule of Williamson County.1 62 In an article on the 2004
Supreme Court term, Judge William A. Fletcher of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit argues that Williamson County
"means that all state-law aspects of regulatory takings claims must
first be litigated in state court ... [and] when state-court litigation is
finished and the state court has ruled against the landowner," then
the landowner can bring a takings claim based on federal law to
federal court. 63 Judge Fletcher reads San Remo to mean that a
federal court must apply both issue preclusion and claim preclusion6
1
He finds that
the practical effect of the Court's decision is that there can be
no regulatory takings litigation challenging state and local land
use regulation in federal district court. That is, Williamson
County requires that suits involving potential federal regulatory
takings claims first be litigated in state court. Only after the
landowner has lost in state court does she have a ripe federal
takings claim. But once the landowner has lost in state court,
there is a Catch-22. She may have a federal takin~s claim, but
1738 prevents her from litigating it in federal court.
This reasoning suggests some reluctance on the part of the Supreme
Court to address federal takings claims. The majority points out that
state courts are "fully competent to adjudicate constitutional
challenges to local land-use decisions."' Further, state courts
"undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts" in resolving
such issues 67 Time will tell whether or not this justification is
satisfactory, but it seems to be rather tenuous.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment.'6 The four
160. Id. at 339.
161. Id. at 340.
162. Id. at 342.
163. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 774.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 348.
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justices agreed that the majority's analysis led to the proper result
under Williamson County. However, they argued that it was time to
reconsider Williamson County because "the justifications for its state-
litigation requirements are suspect, while its impact on takings
plaintiffs is dramatic."'69  Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the
majority's state court familiarity justification. Though he agreed that
state courts were "competent to enforce federal rights and to
adjudicate federal claims," he felt that the majority unfairly singled
out federal takings claims. 7 ° Perhaps he was partially motivated to
continue the recent trend toward rule-formalist analysis in takings
jurisprudence, and so favored federal or Supreme Court adjudication
of those cases.
III. Looking Forward: Future Interpretation of Takings Cases
The Penn Central multi-factor calculus remains the default
standard for takings challenges. Permanent physical occupations and
regulations that deprive the landowner of all economically beneficial
use of her property are governed by the per se takings tests of Loretto
and Lucas. Though the earlier cases discussed above still stand, the
rhetoric under which they are analyzed and political context in which
they stand has changed significantly. Today, the property rights
movement, partially motivated by the Kelo backlash, endeavors to
keep eminent domain issues in the public eye.
Though Kelo caused more of a public sensation, Lingle may
ultimately have a greater effect on the future of takings
jurisprudence. The doctrinal separation of substantive due process
and regulatory takings leaves a major impact on takings
jurisprudence. Lingle refocused the courts' attention on the impact of
the government regulation on the landowner rather than on the
reasons behind the government action. As Judge Fletcher points out,
taken together, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo represent a major shift in
takings jurisprudence-a shift "entirely in the direction of relegating
takings issues to the political and legal judgments of the states......
Kelo basically allows all state and local redevelopment projects, as
long as the redevelopment authority can show the project has a public
use. 72  Lingle stripped down the regulatory takings test to only
169. Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
170. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
171. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 776.
172. Id. at 777.
[Vol. 35:4
TAKING THE COURTS
whether the regulation takes away all economically viable use of the
property, which broadened the state and local regulatory authority. '73
San Remo "effectively requires that all takings claims against state
and local authorities be presented to state courts."'74 This keeps most
takings claims out of the federal courts, and gives state courts the
almost exclusive control over takings protection. Fletcher argues that
the Supreme Court essentially stripped the federal district courts of
jurisdiction over land-use regulatory takings via the San Remo
decision. '75 Indeed, this action may be the Supreme Court's message
on the proper role of the federal courts vis-A-vis state courts in the
takings context.
Conclusion
The federal district courts and the United States Supreme are
certainly comfortable reversing lower court decisions on takings
challenges. This, however, is not unique to takings cases, and tells us
little about the proper relationship between the state and federal
courts. Though the cases discussed in this note provide a multitude of
interrelated tests that state courts can use to determine whether or
not a government action constitutes a compensable taking, the federal
courts rarely define their role vis-A-vis the state courts.
Some cases provide more guidance on the issue. In Lucas, the
Supreme Court offered some direction to the state courts. The
majority opinion acknowledged that the Court's reliance on the
limitations in land ownership that inhere in the "background
principles" of a state's property and nuisance law provide leeway to
state courts in their determination of the scope of a state law.'76 The
extent of this leeway depends on the willingness of the state courts to
evaluate whether their own application of precedent is "objectively
reasonable."'77 This structure is circular, and ultimately keeps the
majority of takings decisions out of the federal courts. San Remo
effectively fills out the Supreme Court's very deferential approach to
state determinations of takings challenges. Whereas the Court has
traditionally given great deference to local and state political bodies,
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 778-79.
176. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992).
177. Id.
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San Remo makes those determinations only enforceable in the state
courts.
Ultimately, and no matter which test applies to a case, the courts
must ask whether or not a taking of property has occurred. First, the
court must determine the extent and nature of the plaintiff's property
rights. Second, it must examine any limitations on those rights that
inhere in state property law, and determine whether the
governmental action goes so far that it takes the individual's property
right, or whether it is within the purview of the state's regulatory or
police power to create such a regulation.178 Political and historical
concerns also weigh in the balance. However, despite the current
trend toward clarity and a better-defined role of the federal courts,
takings jurisprudence is notoriously unsettled. The current focus on
the impact of the regulation or government action on the individual
will provide more guidance for future cases, and may lead the way out
of the takings muddle.
178. Of course permanent physical occupations are treated differently and tend to
present simpler cases.
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